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When examining the causes underlying 
the development of constitutional law in 
Europe in the second half of the 
twentieth century the discussion should 
begin by focusing on the fact that, until 
the post-Second World War period, it 
was extremely unusual, if not unheard of, 
for the European juridical and political 
authorities to conceive of imposing any 
limits on sovereign authority, all the more 
so where this power was exercised by 
organs with a democratic structure.
o
Prior to the French Revolution, the 
possibility of limiting monarchic 
authority had in fact been widely 
debated. According to some, it was 
absolutely to be excluded given the divine 
nature of the investiture which the latter 
represented, while according to a second 
body of opinion a set of 'supreme 
principles' should be introduced which 
also the monarch would be obliged to 
respect.
The shift which subsequently took 
place from a power structure founded on 
divine investiture to one founded on 
democratic investiture formed part of a 
process of transformation which 
occurred during the nineteenth and the 
first half of the twentieth centuries, and 
which gave rise to the constitutional
O
norms underpinning the legal systems of 
most European countries   albeit with 
different modalities in individual cases. 
This change reinforced the view that
o
excludes the placing of any limits on
sovereign power. An important 
contribution to this development was 
also made by the assertion of legal 
positivism; intrinsic to this was the view 
that the law   and above all the 'Code'   
was a product of human rationality 
comparable to the machines which had 
enabled so much extraordinary progress 
to be made in the area of scientific 
discovery.
The clearest symbol of this tendency is 
probably the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty which was established in the 
UK and which had as its consequence the 
progressive reorganisation of the 
monarch's powers to the benefit of the 
elected chamber and the government 
expressed by it. On the Continent, there 
was a parallel development, even if the 
individual constitutional stories vary on 
many points. In France, for example, the 
monarchic cause was finally defeated only 
after 1870, with the advent of the Third 
Republic; in Germany and the countries 
of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the 
same process took place only after 1918, 
although in reality the transformation 
triggered by the Revolution, and spread by 
the movements of the French Army, 
continued to develop practically 
everywhere during the Restoration period, 
albeit gradually. In Italy, the ambiguous 
formula 'by the grace of God and the will 
of the Nation', adopted in 1861 to define 
the powers of the 'constitutional 
monarchy', covered a series of 
compromises between the 'Court faction' 
and the representatives of an electorate 
that was extremely limited as a result of 
the census, but still constituted an 
important step towards parliamentary 
sovereignty, even if it was not until 1946 
that a truly 'universal' suffrage was 
introduced, including the complete 
abolition of the royal prerogative.
It was with reference to these codes 
that the doctrines inspired by the 
principles of legal positivism developed 
the nineteenth-century notion of the law 
as the expression of the volonte generate,
and it was on the basis of this that lawyers 
and legislators rejected any proposal for 
the introduction of a jurisdictional check 
on the constitutionality of laws and 
reduced the range of the constitution   
predominantly if not exclusively   to that 
of a political document. It should be 
remembered that not all the 
constitutions of this period had in fact 
been conceived as flexible, but even 
where constitutional flexibility was 
absolutely excluded, the possibility of a 
constitutional check was consistently 
rejected in the name of the respect due to 
popular sovereignty   of which the law 
was the highest expression   even in the 
very frequent cases in which they were 
the work of non-elected bodies or, where 
they had been elected, there were serious 
doubts as to the representativeness of the 
electoral procedure.
LIMITS ON SOVEREIGN 
AUTHORITY
... until the post-Second World War 
period it was extremely unusual, if not 
unheard of, for the European juridical 
and political authorities to conceive of 
imposing any limits on sovereign 
authority, all the more so where this 
power was exercised by organs \\ith a 
democratic structure.
A first breach in this view can be 
discerned with the introduction of the 
principle of legality (to which the notions 
of'rule of law' and 'Rechstaat' respectively 
in the UK and Germany, both of which 
were developed to meet similar needs, 
correspond); this imposed jurisdictional 
checks on the proceedings of public 
authorities, although it should be said 
that for many years the application of this 
principle encountered various and 
insurmountable obstacles, given the 
'political' nature of some of the 
categories of proceedings. Clearly, the law 
constituted the type of proceeding whose 
political nature was not open to 
discussion. 21
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This line of reasoning did however
o
allow judicial review of administrative 
activity to develop, and this in turn 
allowed important opportunities to open 
up for the legal protection of private 
individuals against the proceedings of
o 1 o
legal authorities in many European 
countries. It was, for example, only a 
small step for the legal scholars of the 
Viennese School' to invent the principle 
of constitutional legality and a checking
o J o
procedure for the constitutionality of 
laws, both of which were based to a great 
extent on the techniques used in 
administrative law.
This approach can of course be placed 
firmly within the positivistic concept of 
the law, as has been amply shown by the 
famous Kelsenian paradox. According to 
this, the flaws in the living 
constitutionality of the law were 
reducible to flaws of formal 
constitutionality, given that any error 
committed by passing a law which was 
incompatible with the precepts of the 
constitution could always be corrected by 
recourse to a revision of the constitution 
itself. This approach was, of course, 
based on theoretical assumptions 
differing sharply from those which had 
allowed, from the beginning of this
o o
particular historical phase, the realisation 
of forms of constitutional justice typical 
in the US.
THE ITALIAN PATH
In Italy, the ambiguous formula 'by the 
grace of God and the will of the 
Nation', adopted in 1861 to define 
the powers of the 'constitutional 
monarchy', covered a series of 
compromises between the 'Court 
faction' and the representatives of an 
electorate that was extremely limited 
as a result of the census, but still 
constituted an important step towards 
parliamentary sovereignty, even if it 
was not until 1946 that a truly 
'universal' suffrage was introduced, 
including the complete abolition of 
the royal prerogative.
Checks on the constitutionality of laws 
in the US initially came into existence in 
an environment influenced by a natural 
law conception of rights, in a model that 
rejected any absolute power and instead 
recognised the existence of human rights 
as inviolable and inalienable. And despite
the fact that, in the period following this, 
positive law doctrines had a wide 
influence in this area, the initial approach 
continued   despite some areas of 
revision   to constitute the basis of the 
notion of constitution and of 
constitutional law.
Indeed a new and substantial 
continuity began to be established 
between the emergent concept of 
democracy and the structuring of 
mandatory constitutional limits for the 
defence of fundamental human rights. In 
the development of European legal 
reasoning, on the other hand, it is noto '
possible to find this kind of continuity; 
the shifts of opinion that were 
discernible during the French
o
Revolution, and which gradually took 
root, were principally concerned with the 
transformation of monarchic authority to 
a representative assembly, rather than 
with the affirmation of a higher level of 
inviolable rights.
Those limits which the political 
thinking of the previous era had 
propounded as efficacious for so-called 
absolute sovereigns were, in reality, when 
compared to democratic power, no 
longer felt to be acceptable. And to little 
avail was the observation that it was 
difficult to realise forms of political 
representation capable of allowing the 
volonte generate effectively to correspond 
to that of the citizens, or at any rate to 
that of the large majority.
Nevertheless, for many years, needs of 
a practical nature necessitated the 
limitation of the suffrage to information 
based on the census, the maintenance of 
unelected second chambers, the royal 
prerogative and other constitutional rules 
which set aside either completely, or at 
any rate in part, any balanced form of 
representation, so as to render even more 
unrealistic the qualification 'democratic' 
to those regimes which operated in many 
European states during the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries. And, obviously, 
among these, were those cases where the 
ancien regime was 'restored', or   even 
more insidiously   which were presented 
as plebiscite democracies (also known as 
'Bonapartism'), where the citizens' will 
was interpreted by the unchallengeable 
decisions of a monarch or dictator. Even 
when the development of political parties 
had opened up the prospect of new 
opportunities for democratic life, 
dissatisfaction with institutions was never
entirely eliminated, despite some changes 
in the approach to representation which 
the followers of the Enlightenment had 
proposed.
US MODEL
Checks on the constitutionality of laws 
in the US initially came into existence 
in an environment influenced by a 
natural law conception of rights, in a 
model that rejected any absolute 
power and instead recognised the 
existence of human rights as inviolable 
and inalienable.
During the twentieth century, 
however, the increasingly obvious 
inadequacy of these approaches   based 
as they were on a combination of 
democratic absolutism with techniques 
derived from legal positivism   began to 
give rise to serious alarm and, above all, 
to demands for a more clearly 
perceptible protection of the 
fundamental rights ' of freedom, 
particularly after the horrifying violations 
of the latter in many European countries 
during the two World Wars and the
o
installation of many violent dictatorships 
in Italy, Germany, Spain, the Soviet 
Union and elsewhere.
Given these tragic events, which
o
sometimes took place within (or almost 
within) the legislative and constitutional 
norms in force at the time, the need to 
achieve more rigorous protection of 
fundamental human rights and the
o
fundamental rights of democracy came to 
the fore, and the introduction of a 
constitutional check on the laws, based 
not only on the ideas of Kelsen but also 
on the American understanding of 
constitution, began to spread in Europe 
too. Over the last fifty years this view has 
become established not only in countries 
which have undergone the experience of 
authoritarian regimes, but also in many 
others, including countries such as 
France (whose political culture had 
always remained inflexible in the face of 
influences of this nature).
Finally, in recent times, the 
phenomenon of the spread of these kinds 
of solutions into the constitutions of East 
European countries as well as those of 
non-European countries emerging from 
periods of close restrictions on 
democracy and liberty, is really very 
striking. It should also be noted that this
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kind of development has frequently led to 
the setting up of instruments 
guaranteeing the independence of the 
judiciary (for example, in France, Italy 
and some other countries a Council of 
the Judiciary has been established), 
together with the transfer of important 
functions generally reserved for the 
executive bodies to independent 
authorities. A clearer need for rationality 
on the part of public authorities has 
moreover, in the past few years, opened 
the way to technical cooperation in the 
drafting of laws (through the checking of
o v o o
their 'feasibility') which has inevitably led 
to further limits on the legislator.
It is in this way that the fact that 
the post-war constitutional justice 
institutions have gone far beyond the 
extension of the legislative activity of the 
principle of legality can be explained, as 
can the fact that this development has led 
above all to reflection on the juridical 
notions of constitution and the 
conception of state and government, the 
most notable result of which consists in 
the renewed search, along different lines, 
for clear limits to sovereign power, even 
when this is democratic. It is no 
coincidence, moreover, that in some 
countries discussion has once more 
centred on the topic of 'inviolable' rights 
and defined certain constitutional 
principles as inviolable, even through 
revision procedures, as occurred in the 
times of the ancien regime.
WEAKNESSES HIGHLIGHTED
... the experiments in liberal 
democracy which have taken place 
over the last two centuries have ... 
highlighted the many weaknesses of 
the organisational models which have
o
been experimented with.
In the case of Italy this development 
has manifested itself with particular and 
significant characteristics due to certain 
chance events which have stimulated the 
institutional fantasy of the jurists and, in 
particular, of the judges of the 
Constitutional Court. The most 
important of these was probably the one 
which led to the adoption of a 
constitution based on democratic 
principles, but which did not ensure that 
the corresponding legislative reforms 
were enacted; the court has thus for 
many years found itself in the position of 
having to fulfil the function of the
o
promoter of legislative reforms required 
by the constitution itself, rather than that 
of the guarantor of the constitution 
against any eventual violations. This came
o s
about through the acceptance of a legal 
notion of the constitution which allowed 
it to be used as a legal norm and as a 
higher law, along the lines of the 
American concept. Given that the 
paralysis of legislative activity that derives 
from the peculiar characteristics of 
Italian parliamentary proceedings has not 
been cured by the constitutional crisis of 
the 90s and the electoral reforms of 
1993, it is more than likely that this 
function of the Constitutional Court will 
find the opportunity to manifest itself 
again in the future.
No less important is the German case, 
where the contribution of the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht to the restoration 
of a democratic way of life has been 
decisive; or those of Spain and Portugal, 
whose constitutional courts have played a 
decisive role in the re-establishment of 
fundamental rights.
o
Released from the obligation to 
protect the rights of individuals, other 
important functions exercised by some 
constitutional courts have also been 
extremely significant   from the checking 
of electoral procedures for the highest 
offices of state to the resolution of 
conflicts between state authorities, and 
between the state and territorial agencies 
(in regional and federal states).
One particularly important example of 
this can be seen in the work of the French 
Conseil constitutionnel, which was neither 
instituted in reaction to an authoritarian 
regime nor conceived as a true and 
proper system of constitutional justice. 
Despite this, it has managed to carve out 
precisely this kind of role for itself, 
adapting any procedural and 
organisational rules that are not entirely
o J
appropriate to the exercising of this 
function.
The lack of links with ordinary judges, 
the possibility of checking the 
constitutionality of laws only as a 
preventive measure and on the initiative 
of political subjects, together with the 
rules established for the selection of its 
members, had led many commentators 
to believe that the Conseil could not 
operate in the manner of a true 
constitutional court and that it would 
inevitably have taken on an essentially 
political role (which was in fact the role
that the Gaullist constitution had 
reserved for it). However, the influence 
of legal culture, which circulates freely 
over state boundaries and through the
o
cultural traditions of different peoples, 
has led members of this body to behave 
like judges. This has allowed them to 
assume a role of great importance, which 
has been reinforced ipso facto by the 
modifications made to the rules which 
govern it.
o
The activity of the European 
constitutional courts, like that of the 
Supreme Court of the USA, has thereby 
created a tradition of great importance, 
both in the protection of fundamental 
rights and with regard to the democratic
o o
system of the organisation of public 
powers. This tradition is referred to 
explicitly by the constituting treaties of 
the European Union and it is towards 
them that the new democracies of 
Eastern Europe, Eatin America and other 
parts of the world now look.
No one can doubt, especially since the 
fall of the Soviet Union, that the 
principles of liberal democracy constitute 
an irreversible step forward in political 
thought that is no less important than the 
advances in scientific thought which have
o
allowed the great technological
o o
developments characterising these times 
to take place. It is however no less true to 
say that the experiments in liberal 
democracy which have taken place over 
the last two centuries have also 
highlighted the many weaknesses of the
o o J
organisational models which have been 
experimented with. It is precisely this 
kind of comparison between the various 
results of the applications of scientific 
theories that has allowed the surprising 
incompleteness and imperfection   and 
the consequent serious risk of exposure   
of the constitutional orders to be noted. 
Recent developments which have led to 
the developing of the role of 
constitutional jurisdictions and the other 
guarantor institutions mentioned above 
obviously constitute an attempt to meet 
the needs of technology also in the area 
of politics. @
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